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D

oes the fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause—the promise that “no state shall deny equal protection of the laws”—have any relevance to the progressive
project of reducing economic inequality in various spheres of life or, more
modestly, of ameliorating the multiple vulnerabilities of this country’s
poor people? The short answer, I believe, is, it depends. It will depend,
in 2020, just as it depends now, on what we mean by the Constitution we
are expounding: the Constitution as read and interpreted by courts—
the adjudicated Constitution—or what I propose to call the legislated
Constitution, the Constitution looked to by the conscientious legislator
as he or she seeks to fulfill her political obligations. My claim in this
chapter is that the legislated, rather than the adjudicated, Constitution
can more plausibly be read as guaranteeing an equality that is supportive
of progressive goals rather than in tension with them. Programmatically,
I will suggest that progressive lawyers should take this opportunity of
their respite from judicial power and attend to the development of that
Constitution, so that we might at some point in the future urge fidelity
to it on the part of our representatives, rather than continue to attend,
with the same intense devotion that still characterizes our current legal
zeitgeist, to the adjudicated Constitution.

The very coherence of a “legislated Constitution,” however, depends
upon an accompanying jurisprudence (or, awkwardly, legisprudence),
and that is a jurisprudence that is currently entirely missing from even
the most utopian constitutional theorizing. I will conclude by suggesting what that jurisprudence might look like and what its creation, or
rediscovery, will require.

Equality and the Adjudicated Constitution
The question before us in this chapter is whether the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equality implies the existence of social or
economic welfare rights, and consequently mandates some level of congressional or state legislative intervention, so as to give those rights substance. Now, as a matter of doctrine, this question is almost absurd.
Doctrinally, it is as clear as these things can ever possibly be that the Equal
Protection Clause, as expounded by courts, carries no such meaning.1
What the “equal protection” promised by the Fourteenth Amendment
requires, according to the Supreme Court’s interpretive gloss, is a limited right to be free of the legislator’s casual or malign discriminatory
instincts toward specified groups, as expressed in laws that unequally
discriminate for irrational reasons against those groups’ members. The
vague phrase “equal protection” is thereby given a specific, and narrow,
content: The point of the clause is not a broad guarantee of protection
(equal or otherwise) against various unstated evils or harms—such as
private violence, or natural catastrophe, or war, or poverty, or economic
subordination, or any other interference with welfare—but rather, a
guarantee of protection against pernicious laws and lawmakers that irrationally discriminate against some group of citizens, when and if such
affirmative government services are offered. The modifier “equal,” on
this reading, is reduced to a limited guarantee of legislative rationality.
The point of the clause is not to render various groups equal, but to
render them, if various conditions are met, equal beneficiaries of some
governmental actions, and then only if the inequality is a function of irrational discriminatory animus. All of this has been much criticized by
the Court’s critics.
What’s gone relatively unnoticed, however, or at least unremarked
upon, in the course of the development of this judicial interpretation
is the fate of the two-letter preposition in the phrase “equal protection
of the laws.” The “of ” in the phrase “of the laws,” again in the Court’s
reading of the amendment, is replaced by the preposition “against.” We
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are not, under the judicial construction of the phrase, entitled to equal
protection of the law, or of the state, or of the lawmaker, in virtually
any sense. We are, rather, somewhat entitled to equal protection against
law—or at least, some of us are sometimes protected against one kind
of bad law, and that is a law that is bad because it irrationally discriminates on the basis of a short list of specified characteristics, such as race,
ethnicity, sex, or religious affiliation. That transformation of the clause’s
meaning—from “equal protection of law” to “equal protection against
law”—has been hugely consequential. The Fourteenth Amendment,
intended, perhaps, as a guarantor of the benefits of law to those who had
previously not enjoyed its protections, has become, instead, a guarantor
against legalistic malfeasance. Law itself, on this formal understanding,
rather than being construed as a blessing to be bestowed equally on all
citizens, is construed as an evil, against which the Constitution stands
guard.
What has this formal rather than substantive understanding of
equality meant, in practice, for the country’s poor? To be sure, it is
not nothing—poor people are sometimes irrationally discriminated
against by legislators.2 But as a weapon for combating poverty itself, the
promise of formal equality is baldly illusory. It is not, after all, poverty
that is targeted by an antidiscrimination principle, even if such a principle can be read capaciously so as to prohibit discrimination against
the poor. It is, rather, the irrational failure to grant poor individuals
goods or privileges where that grant would be forthcoming but for the
individual’s impoverishment, and is being denied for no good reason.
It is the failure, in effect, to spot the diamond in the rough, and to give
the diamond his due; it is not the nickel-and-dimed living conditions
of those persons—whether they are diamonds or not—who actually
live in the rough, which is targeted by formal, rather than substantive,
equality. For the occasional diamond so uncovered, this might be substantial protection indeed. For poor people in general, however, this is
nothing—no protection at all.
An argument can surely be made that the Court’s displacement of the
“of ” with “against,” in the phrase “equal protection of law,” as well as
the formal understanding of equality that follows from it, is more than
a little in tension with the Fourteenth Amendment’s plain meaning,
language, logic, and noncontroversial history. The amendment doesn’t
say that all citizens are granted a right to equal protection from law or
against law; it says that all citizens are granted a right to the equal protection of law. Laws, and the states and legislators that produce them,
are constructed by the most natural meaning of the amendment as being
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on the whole rather good things that states ought to bestow equally, so
as to protect people from some evil or harm from which they might suffer in the absence of law’s protection. It doesn’t posit law itself as the evil
against which individuals need protection. Rather, the absence of law is
constructed by the most natural meaning of that sentence, as being the
bad thing from which citizens must be protected. By the amendment’s
language, it is the absence of law, not the discriminatory law, which is
conducive to the conditions against which states have a duty to protect
us. Furthermore, states, by the plain language of the amendment, must
affirmatively do something; thus, it seems to be state inaction, not state
action, which is unconstitutional. One thing states must do is protect
people, and they must do it, furthermore, through affirmative acts of
lawmaking.
Why, then, has the Supreme Court so steadfastly abided by its formal
understanding of equality, which is so seemingly belied by the history
and language itself?3 Why, indeed, has it failed to even acknowledge these
claims?4 It seems to me that there are three possibilities. One possibility,
suggested by a number of scholars, is institutional. The Court wants to
require only what it can confidently enforce, and while it can mandate
that irrational and discriminatory laws be struck—that action is relatively costless—it simply can’t enforce a broad antisubordinationist or
welfare-based understanding of equality upon unwilling state actors.5
A second possibility—and this is more in line with the foundational
assumption of the American Constitutional Society (ACS)—is that the
Court has chosen this particular doctrinal path, as well as a number of
others over the last half century, for essentially political and ideological
reasons. I am dubious: I don’t think this is a plausible account of the last
half century of judicial practice.
Let me suggest a somewhat different explanation for the Court’s
attraction to formal equality and its hostility to substantive understandings of equality. At least a part of the story regarding the Court’s insistence on a formal rather than substantive understanding of equality might
be jurisprudential, rather than either political or institutional. Look at
one striking feature of the formal meaning of equality embraced by the
Court, which has gone relatively unexamined in scholarly literature: the
degree to which the formal understanding of the constitutional equality
guarantee—that legislators must treat likes alike, differences differently,
and must more or less rationally ascertain those differences—echoes,
in fact, perfectly mirrors, judicial understanding of the requirements
of stare decisis, of the meaning of precedent, of the meaning of legal
justice, of the rule of law, and so forth. Judges, when deciding virtually
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all cases, must treat likes alike and rationally discern differences, and
they must do so, furthermore, toward the end of doing justice. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, given this understanding of the meaning of justice,
given our history of irrational racism emanating from legislatures, and
given an incredibly wide degree of interpretive latitude, the twentiethcentury Supreme Court wound up reading the equality provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment as imposing the same legalistic requirement on
legislators that it imposes on itself. Legislators, if subject to a mandate
of equal treatment, no less than judges, and subject to the mandate of
the rule of law, must treat like groups alike, just as judges must treat
like litigants alike. Legislators should only differentiate between groups
for good reasons and not bad, just as judges should only differentiate
between litigants and cases for good reasons and not bad. Both branches
should do so, furthermore, toward the end of maintaining as much continuity as possible, not creating disruption between the past and the
present. The meaning of the “equality” to be required of legislators, but
interpreted by judges, is thus overlaid with the judges’ own understanding of the equality they require of themselves. Equal protection of the
law in the judicial context clearly requires like treatment of likes; this
is, again, the shared judicial understanding of what equality under law
means. “Equal protection of law” in the legislative context, but as interpreted by judges, requires no less, but also no more.
My claim is that it is this overlay of the demands of adjudicative
rationality (or nondiscrimination) on the mandate of equality that the
Constitution imposes on legislatures that has perversely limited the substantive scope of the mandate. Constitutional equality, on the Court’s
reading, requires that legislators behave rationally, just as stare decisis,
precedent, and the rule of law require that judges do likewise, and it
does so toward the end of conserving and preserving the institutions of
the past with as little disruption as possible. Equality, so says the Court,
requires no more. It does not require that legislators undertake legislation to reduce the substantive economic inequality between persons or
groups of persons. It does not require that legislators use law to protect
anyone from anything. It does not require that law be the means by
which social or economic equality is guaranteed, or comes to pass, or
at least becomes more likely than not. It requires only that when legislators legislate, they do so rationally. It targets law itself as the evil
that frustrates equality, rather than inequality as the evil against which
we might sensibly seek out law’s protection. It does so not because the
language requires this reading or the history suggests it. If anything,
the language and history both require something considerably more
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capacious. It does so because of judicial, jurisprudential habit. Legal
equality, from a judicial point of view, means the rational differentiation
of cases toward the end of like treatment. Constitutional equality, then,
from a judicial point of view, imposes that adjudicative understanding
of the equal protection they are constitutionally obligated to deliver—
and notably, only that adjudicative understanding of the equal protection
they are constitutionally required to deliver—on legislators.
It seems to me that this overlay—of a judicial understanding of
what equality requires of judges onto a constitutional understanding
of what the constitutional guarantee of equality requires of legislators—
is not a lousy coincidence or an unfortunate verbal pun. Nor is it, in my
view, a correctable doctrinal mistake. Formal equality is the jurisprudential ideal at the heart of the meaning of adjudicative law.6 Treating
likes alike is what judges do when they are doing their jobs morally
and doing them well. Put that judicial ideal together with an undeniable social fact, to wit, that courts, as well as the larger legal culture,
have rendered the Constitution, and constitutional law, a child of adjudicative law. The conclusion for the constitutional meaning of equality
is overdetermined: It is a perfectly natural inference that the equality
guaranteed by that body of adjudicative law, in the eyes of judges, is the
equality guaranteed by adjudicative law quite generally. Formal equality
is, therefore, from the pens and minds of judges, the limit of the equality
required of legislators when they are enacting law.
The consequence of all of this is strikingly hostile to the very idea of
affirmative welfare rights (in any of its various incarnations). Legislative
irrationality, not worldly inequality, becomes the target of the guarantee of equality when equality is rendered formal. Law becomes the
evil addressed through the constitutional guarantee, rather than the
means by which the guarantee is made real. To provide equal protection, the legislator must behave rationally, meaning, in line with the
directives suggested by current social reality, just as the judge, if she is
to decide cases in accordance with the rule of law, must do so in a way
that is rational and consistent with, rather than at odds with, the past.
By insisting that the Equal Protection Clause means, basically, a promise of rationality in legislation, the Court has judicialized the legislator,
at least with respect to equality: It has made him a mini-judge. The
only ideals to which we hold him are the ideals and the constraints of
judging: rationality in categorization and fidelity to the past. We limit
to the vanishing point his understanding of his very purpose being that
of transformation, or change, through law; limit to the vanishing point
his understanding that the substantive equality that might be delivered
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through law might be part of his constitutional project, rather than law
being the poison that frustrates equality. The Equal Protection Clause,
read formally, emasculates the legislator from being an agent of effective change. The Equal Protection Clause, read formally, as a mandate
that legislators as well as judges must rationally align their actions with
the contours of social reality, has become an obstacle, not a vehicle, of
progressive, egalitarian politics.
What does this portend for the future? Well, if the attraction to a
formal rather than substantive understanding of equality is indeed a
function of jurisprudential self-understanding, rather than institutional
necessity or doctrinal mistake, then it is going to be next to impossible
to dislodge. Quite generally, in law, if not in life, the past is indeed prologue. In all of adjudicatory law, but particularly in constitutional law,
the past is read so as to better define and delimit the future. In fact, that’s
its point. That is just what judge-made law aims to do—to nail down the
future, so to speak, to preordain it, to render it a known fact, rather than
an unknown variable, an inchoate possibility. Perhaps for good-enough
reasons, perhaps not, courts honor the past: Integrity and consistency
have real moral weight. The past has substantial authority. That’s the
point of the entire enterprise; it is central to judicial identity. In the constitutional context, furthermore, the moral weight of the past is magnified: The courts will be even less willing to overturn or depart from an
understanding of equality that is as central to a judicialized understanding of the ideal of law itself as is their interpretation of formal equality.
They might tinker at the margins, but they are not going to ever depart
from its core content. Partly for this reason, I believe, progressives
should not look to the courts, even to idealized counterfactual courts
staffed with judges appointed by the Obama-Biden administration of
2008, for either programmatic solutions to problems of economic and
social injustice or even for more limited declarations of principle on
which other institutional actors might act.
None of this, however, closes the door on the questions posed at the
outset of this chapter regarding the true meaning of constitutionalism and
the future of constitutional development. Obviously, the Equal Protection
Clause may require minimal social justice, even though the Court has never
held as much. I’m not suggesting for a moment that we turn our backs
on the Constitution as a source of moral authority for a future War on
Poverty or, more generally, as a cultural mandate to achieve a more egalitarian society in the twenty-first century. It does mean, though, that the
American Constitution Society should at least entertain the possibility that
courts might be jurisprudentially incapable of seeing in the Constitution
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a range of meanings that are quite self-evidently there, including a mandate of economic justice. What follows is that we need to ask whether
the Constitution, or the constitutions, that might be developed outside
the walls of courts might be fruitfully aligned with progressive activism
against poverty, even if the adjudicated Constitution is not promising.

Equality and the Legislated Constitution
So, let me turn to what I call the legislated Constitution—by which
I mean simply the Constitution that legislators are duty-bound to uphold. Instead of imagining a liberal judge in 2020, let’s go whole hog
and imagine an enlightened, or at least conscientious, idealized legislator. That legislator, state or federal, wants to do her moral, political, and constitutional duty by the citizenry. That legislator reads the
Constitution and sees there a mandate that “no state shall deny equal
protection of the law.” For that legislator, the Constitution carries a direct, linguistically untortured command: The state must provide something, and what it must provide is equal protection of law.
How is this to be interpreted? It seems to me that there is a more
natural fit between the well-understood political ideals of conscientious
legislators, going back to the time of the ancient Greeks, and a foundational, constitutional commitment that the sovereign act in such a way as
to equally protect the well-being of all and that it do so, in part, through
the recognition of positive rights. The conscientious legislator is or
ought to be accustomed to the idea that she acts so as to effect a change
in social reality. Her ideal for moral action—what it means for her to
legislate—is for that reason alone more consistent with a Constitution
that requires, in the name of equal protection of all, substantial intervention into extant social reality, so as to address social and economic
inequality. Just this bare minimum fit between commonly understood
ideals of the art of legislation and the idea of positive rights contrasts
pretty sharply with the position of even the conscientious judge of 2020
with the best moral and political values imaginable. There is just no
such easy fit, and in fact it is an awkward fit at best and maybe no fit at
all between the understood purpose of adjudication, particularly in the
constitutional context, and a foundational commitment to act in such
a way as to employ law so as to protect all and to protect equally. The
judge acts on the basis of principle toward the articulation of a body
of law the purposes of which—read generously—are to build continuity with the past, hold legislation and legislators at bay, and enforce
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individual rights to be free of overreaching or irrational law. He does
not act on the basis of a concern for the well-being of all nor toward the
end of protecting the well-being of all against unspecified evils, whether
equally or otherwise.
The legislator, unlike the judge, does not and should not view her act
as an attempt to secure an uninterrupted fidelity to the past, nor to avoid
disruption, nor to maximize individual freedom by holding the legislator at bay, nor to uncover and articulate otherwise opaque legal rules
through the analogical method of uncovering the rational like treatment
of likes and then papering it with a carefully verbalized generality. The
legislator, rather, unlike the judge, presumably acts—legislates—in order
to change a status quo; she does not act—adjudicate—in order to further cement and further rationalize extant social relations. The legislator, unlike the judge, ought to realize that the work of legislating must
be directed toward the protection of the interests of all citizens against
various evils or harms—and that her constitutional obligation, therefore, is to legislate in such a way so that protection is bestowed equally,
rather than view her work as that of thwarting legislation toward the end
of securing individualized rights. The conscientious legislator, at least,
might be legitimately convinced that the duty to legislate in such a way
as to protect the interests of all includes not only a duty to protect against
the threat of foreign invasion and not only a duty to protect legal entitlements bestowed by the common law, but also, given our particular history, constitutional and otherwise, a duty to protect against exploitation
and the subordination that can follow it. Likewise, given our economic
and constitutional history, such a legislator might be persuaded that the
evils to be protected against, by law, bestowed equally, include the evils
that are the side-product of unbridled capitalism, as evidenced by the
twentieth century’s legislative interventions: the labor legislation of the
New Deal, the civil rights codes of the 1960s, the environmental legislation of the ’70s, the anti-age and disability discrimination acts of the ’80s,
and so on. Indeed, if we reverse our habitual identification of the core
of constitutional law as consisting of a collection of judicial decisions,
and look instead at legislative decisions made either pursuant to constitutional mandate or in part inspired by constitutional ideals as the core
of constitutional law, then it becomes quite clear that the conscientious
legislator has, at more than a few moments in the history of twentiethcentury constitutional law, viewed her moral obligation and the constitutional mandate under which she works in just this way.
So, a substantive understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
grand phrases is more consistent with the goals of legislation than goals
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of adjudication. At least, there is not the glaring inconsistency between
the most natural reading of those clauses and the ideals and practical
constraints of the legislature as there is with respect to adjudication. The
lawmaker must act in such a way as to provide equal protection of the law
to all. He must legislate in such a manner that all are equally protected
against the harms that can be deterred or prevented through law. The
constitutional mandate, understood as a directive to the lawmaker, rather
than the adjudicator, concerns the ways in which law should or could be
used in order to promote the equal protection of all. Understood this
way, the Equal Protection Clause is not about protecting people from
the product of legislation. It is about how to use legislation to protect
people from other evils. Understood this way, at least this part of the
Constitution constructs law, in other words, as a rather good thing, all
things considered. Law is the means by which the constitutional entitlement is secured, rather than the evil against which the constitutional
entitlement guards us. The lawmaker is the agent of the constitutional protection, rather than an irrational, whimsical, overly emotional
or impassioned, frenzied, possibly corrupt, undoubtedly racist, homophobic, misogynist, vengeful, interest-obsessed, swashbuckling boozer,
from whom the lonely and noble individual, in his rights-bearing glory,
quite sensibly seeks protection.
Let me finish by suggesting what would be required, jurisprudentially, to make the promise of the equality guaranteed by the legislated
Constitution coherent. We don’t currently have a constitutional jurisprudence that supports even the existence, much less the coherence,
of the legislated Constitution. We have, instead, a jurisprudence overwhelmingly committed to three definitional and foundational propositions, which, when taken together, virtually foreclose any possibility
of developing a legislated Constitution. The first proposition: Law is,
definitionally, some combination of that to which courts turn, when
making law, and that which courts make when deciding cases, but either
way, it is a part of the adjudicative, not the legislative, process. Second:
The Constitution is law. Combining these two yields the third: The
Constitution, as law, is to be interpreted by courts, and apparently
exclusively so.
To develop a legislated Constitution, we would have to upset that
conventional apple cart—which should not be all that hard to do. None
of these definitional equivalencies are required by our constitutional
history. Yes, the Supremacy Clause identifies the Constitution as law,
but it does not define law as being “whatever courts say”—that came
a hundred years later. When Chief Justice John Marshall declared in
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Marbury v. Madison that it is the Court’s role to say what “the law” is,
he was, at least according to a growing number of historians, referring
to the Court’s duty to state the content of ordinary law. This duty to
state the content of ordinary law does indeed require an inquiry into
the constitutionality of legislative or common-law pronouncements. It
doesn’t follow, however, from either the Supremacy Clause or Marshall’s
utterance that the Court is the only, the ultimate, or the primary interpreter of constitutional meaning. The Constitution, in other words, is
a part of the judicial inquiry into what ordinary legislated or common
law is, and it is the Court’s duty to state what that ordinary law is. The
Constitution, however, might also be part of the legislative inquiry into
what the ordinary law should be. If so, then it is the legislature’s duty to
act accordingly. In short, neither the Supremacy Clause nor Marshall’s
dictum, nor the two taken jointly, preclude the constitutional possibility,
or the constitutional necessity, of a legislated Constitution—a developed body of statutory law that, with accompanying secondary literature, articulates the meaning of constitutional guarantees as understood
and implemented by legislating bodies.
So where does this leave us? The historical work that needs to be
done to sustain the case for the legislated Constitution is well under way.
But, with respect to the jurisprudence needed to sustain the legislated
Constitution, the work is not yet happening. Such a constitutional legisprudence would consist of four largely forgotten, though certainly not
novel claims. First, it would require the development (or recapture) of an
ancient understanding of the idea of “law” or, more specifically, of “natural law,” as consisting of a set of moral imperatives that can and ought to
guide the art of legislation, rather than as a set of moral imperatives that,
at most, constrain legislation. Second, it would require an understanding of “constitutional law” as part of that law. We lost that at the midtwentieth-century mark, when we began to understand Justice Marshall’s
ambiguous declaration in Marbury that the Court’s duty is to say “what
the law is” as an unambiguous declaration that it is the Court’s duty to
say what constitutional law requires of law. Third, it would require an
understanding of the state as under a moral duty, a legal duty, and a
constitutional duty to act in the interest of all, and not just a prohibition against acting in certain discriminatory ways. We lost that understanding, I believe, dating from the mid-twentieth-century’s civil rights
successes—with that period’s profound distrust of state actors and its correlative sense that legalist ideals can only be achieved through constraining, rather than guiding, the legislator’s hand. Fourth, it would require
an understanding of law’s point or purpose as being the protection of
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people from the oppressions of each other, and not just protection of
the individual from the state. We lost that dating from the commencement of our “civil libertarian” tradition, which has been given a boost by
reproductive and sexual freedom cases since the 1970s.
I hope that the American Constitutional Society, in its deliberations
between now and 2020, will attend to the need to develop a jurisprudence
that might support the legislated Constitution. Without it—without an
understanding of what the Constitution requires the legislator to do,
instead of only an understanding of what the Constitution forbids; without an understanding of the positive value of law, instead of only an
understanding of its dangers; without an understanding of what, morally, a conscientious legislator must do in order to fulfill his or her distinctly political obligations when acting as a free and moral agent—the
very basic claim of this society that constitutionalism supports the progressive hope of creating a more equal and less treacherous world hovers between the radically counterfactual and the flatly oxymoronic. The
Constitution, interpreted by courts as ordinary law, will yield precious
little by way of progress albeit quite a bit by way of law.
With such jurisprudence in place, we could at least begin to make
sense of the specific claim that the Equal Protection Clause might
actually require a congressional, legislated response to substantive inequality. More largely, we might begin to make sense of the very grand
claim of the ACS that progressive politics is somehow supported by,
or required by, or at least not antithetical to, constitutional mandates,
properly understood. With such a jurisprudence in place, the platform
of the American Constitutional Society might become a matter of
common sense.
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